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 nder the auspices of the EU, Belgrade and Pristina have signed new agreements  on 
how to further normalise their mutual relations. The implementation of these 
agreements remains something of a challenge, however. 
Everyone involved is expressing joy and satisfaction – and in the case of the potentates in 
Belgrade and Pristina – even triumphalism. The reason for this is that on August 25th in 
Brussels, Prime Ministers Aleksandar Vučić (Serbia) and Isa Mustafa (Kosovo) signed four 
agreements, facilitated by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini. In Mogherini’s 
words to the press: this outcome is a “landmark achievement” in the normalisation process 
between Belgrade and Pristina. In view of the festering Serb-Albanian resentments in the 
Belgrade-Pristina-Tirana triangle, how come everyone is so pleased? 
One reason is that the wording of the most important of the four agreements – on the 
establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo1 – is one 
more exercise in “constructive ambiguity”. I heard this phrase for the first time when a 
former high-ranking EU official was explaining why, from the beginning, most of the 
agreements between Belgrade and Pristina were written in such foggy terms. If we do not 
sustain the necessary level of ambiguity, he explained, they would never agree on anything, 
because their domestic constituencies would reject genuine concessions. Yet, he added, we 
need to move on constructively. Indeed, the latest Serb-Albanian arrangements are a 
continuation of this exercise in constructive ambiguity. They permit Vučić, Mustafa, and 
Mogherini to continue telling their audiences that they have won, once again and in outright 
terms. This has been so since April 2013, when Belgrade and Pristina signed their first 
“historic” agreement on the normalisation of relations.  
The title of the agreement – on the Association/Community – is telling in itself. Belgrade insists 
on calling the invention a “Community”, suggesting that it is a legal entity with executive 
powers. Pristina is adamant about sticking to the term “Association”; insisting that this is 
only a kind of a non-governmental organisation with no executive powers. The agreement 
                                                     
1 For the text of the agreement, see: (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/docs/150825_02_association-community-of-serb-majority-municipalities-in-kosovo-general-
principles-main-elements_en.pdf). The other three agreements deal with energy, telecoms, and the 
“Freedom of Movement/Mitrovica Bridge”. 
U 
2 | DUŠAN RELJIĆ 
 
promises to the Association/Community its own budget and a “full overview” (whatever 
that may mean) of the local economy, education, health care, spatial planning and so on. 
However, the entity will operate under Kosovo law and will have to work with the central 
authorities of Kosovo. It will be interesting to observe whether within four months, as 
stipulated in the agreement, the Association/Community will receive its statute and then 
indeed what its implementation will eventually look like. If past practice in the EU-facilitated 
process is anything to go by, one should not have too many high hopes. Each previous 
agreement was followed by hesitant steps to put it into effect and fresh bickering between 
the two sides.  
Four months is a long time in political life, especially for southeast European leaders. 
Belgrade and Pristina are hoping for important political gains in the next 120 days that might 
bolster the standing of the incumbent governments. Vučić wishes that during this time Berlin 
and other chief decision-makers in the EU will agree to the opening of the first chapters of 
the accession negotiations with Serbia – something that Belgrade has been striving for since 
receiving candidate status a year and a half ago. Mustafa would love to gain visa-free travel 
entry for his compatriots (bearers of Kosovan passports are the only ones in southeast 
Europe who still need entry permits for the Schengen-zone). All of this would be highly 
appreciated for domestic use. Vučić is publicly discussing snap elections; even though he 
already holds a comfortable parliamentary majority, any further deterioration of the 
economic situation could darken his perspectives. Mustafa is aware that if the Specialist 
Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office (established recently after much arm-wrestling by the US 
and the EU) were to investigate allegations of war crimes by members of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, this could decimate the present political cohort in Pristina – leaving him 
more steadfastly in pole position than he is now.   
The other agreements – on energy, telecoms, opening the bridge in the divided city of 
Mitrovica for pedestrians – are also highly ambiguous. Yes, Kosovo will receive its own 
international dialling code (+383), but the Serbian code will remain functional in the northern 
Serbian municipalities and calls to and from Serbia will be billed as national calls. And so it 
goes on... 
Admittedly, each new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina diminishes the presence of 
Serbian law and state institutions in the north of Kosovo. However, although Pristina can de 
jure claim sovereignty over the majoritarian Serb north, it also diminishes the chances that 
the Albanian-dominated central authorities might take effective control over this area. 
Effectively, a condominium between Belgrade and Pristina over the north of Kosovo is 
formalised step by step. This denouement could prove satisfying for both sides, at least until 
EU accession comes really close. 
In a similar vein, Kosovo’s status after the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 
remains open, with no indication that Russia and China might permit its UN membership or 
that the five EU countries that refuse to recognise Kosovo as a sovereign and independent 
state might change their attitude. Any steps to normalise mutual relations between Belgrade 
and Pristina are, obviously, better than new confrontations and new security risks. Yet 
ultimately, should Serbia’s bid for EU membership come closer to realisation any time soon, 
the Kosovo issue may become a permanent barrier, in the same way that Turkey’s path to the 
EU remains blocked by the North Cyprus issue.  
Constructive ambiguity would have to take on new dimensions to enable an agreement that 
would: a) reconcile the competing sovereignty claims over Kosovo; b) satisfy the demand of 
the US and most EU members for a binding solution based on the acceptance of Kosovo’s 
sovereignty; c) take into account the interest of some EU members (and powerful global 
actors such as Russia and China) not to consent to unilateral secessions that create 
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precedents that are potentially harmful to their own territorial integrity. Solving this 
conundrum remains a challenge for all parties involved. What makes the task it even harder 
is the unremitting deterioration of the economic and social situation in southeast Europe. 
Kosovo’s populace is already showing signs of despair. According to official data, in the last 
twelve months as many as 100,000 Albanians and Roma from Kosovo and Albania proper 
have applied for political asylum in Germany alone. In reality, they are not politically 
persecuted but neglected by their governments, which seem incapable of fostering growth 
and social welfare. The economic situation in the whole region, including in EU-member 
Croatia, is dire, with horrendous unemployment rates especially among the younger 
generation (50-70% in Kosovo, according to estimates of international financial institutions) 
and rising poverty. Before wasting their lives and the lives of their children in deprivation, 
many people in the region decide to risk irregular migration. 
EU member states are only now starting to grasp that these exodus waves will not cease any 
time soon. This realisation might induce them to regulate their labour markets for entrants 
from the Western Balkans and to foster modern vocational training programmes in this 
region. Also, they might consider a Keynesian-style investment programme for southeast 
Europe, in order to boost employment there. 
